

Model parameters

l_v : The voter's position-in or out of the mayor's electoral coalition ($l_v=1, -1$)

θ_{vi} : The benefit that accrues to the voter from the provision a public good. I assume $\theta_{vi} \geq 0$

θ_{vj} : The benefit that accrues to the voter from the provision a private good. I assume $\theta_{vj} \geq 0$

ϕ_{vi} : The percentage of public goods the voter believes will remain in the next period $0 \leq \phi_{vi} \leq 1$

ϕ_{vj} : The percentage of private good the voter believes will remain in the next period $0 \leq \phi_{vj} \leq 1$


δ_{Mi} : The capacity of the mayor for providing a public good, I assume $0 \leq \delta_{Mi} \leq 1$

δ_{Mj} : The capacity of the mayor for providing a private good, I assume $0 \leq \delta_{Mj} \leq 1$

α_M : The benefit that accrues to the mayor from complying with policies of administrative decentralization. I assume $\alpha \geq 0$

λ_M : The mayor's benefit for holding office, I assume $\lambda_M > 0$

Complete Information Game



Incomplete Information Game

